Original Position-3: Justification

Let us assume that society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantages marked by conflicting interests and aspirations of the participating members (aka citizens). The construction of “just” social structure is concerned with the set of principles whereby distribution of advantages (and disadvantages) is agreed upon by its members in a moral framework. These principles based on which we can select various social arrangements along with the rights and duties of the members and decide upon their distributive shares, are the principles of social justice. 

A theory of social justice can be modeled on the social contract theory where consenting parties are ready to surrender some of their freedoms to some authority, in exchange for the protection of their remaining and significant rights. Such a theory can incorporate moral principles of equality and reciprocity in its “original position”. At this starting point there is no discrimination between consenting members; they are all treated as equals behind the “veil of ignorance”. This veil is the essential feature of the original position wherein no member knows her place in the society, her class position or social status nor does anyone know her fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, her intelligence, strength and the like. Nor again, does anyone know her conception of good, the particulars of her rational plan of life, or even the special features of her psychology. The participants also do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. Further, the persons in the original position have no information as to which generation they belong. The veil of ignorance along with other conditions are supposed to remove differences in bargaining advantages and situate the participants in symmetrical positions, making original position conducive to the application of reciprocity.

In this original position consenting parties however know all kinds of general information about persons, societies, laws and economics governing the societies, psychology, and social, formal, and natural sciences.  There are no limitations on general information, that is, on general laws and theories, since conception of justice must be adjusted to the characteristics of the systems of social cooperation which they are to regulate. What they lack however is knowledge of any particular facts about their own lives or other persons' lives, as well as knowledge of any historical and particular facts about their society. Since the parties are required to come to an agreement on the objective and universal principles of justice, knowledge of particular and historical facts about any person or society is said to be morally irrelevant and potentially prejudicial to their decision.

In addition, the consenting members are assumed to be rational beings who can negotiate their ends with other members within the framework of equality, reciprocity, and neutrality. Persons so engage are said to have two types of moral powers: “(i) Capacity for the sense of justice. It is the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of (political) justice that specify the fair terms of social cooperation; (ii) Capacity for the conception of what is good and righteous - to have, to revise, and to pursue such a conception.” The agreement reached between the rational beings with these moral powers are said to be fair to all, yielding the name “justice as fairness” [JAF] and its Theory [JAFT].

In JAFT the “veil” is said to be ‘thick’ which offers almost no specific or particular information related to participating members and societies. In some other versions the veil is said to be “thin” where a member gets some information about other members and societies but again gets no information about self. In both cases self-information is concealed to ensure impartial (neutral) choice. This is then is the principle of informed neutrality – it is informed because the member is supposed to have all the general information to make intelligent choices, while it is neutral because the choices are made without any direct tangible self-interest due to concealment of self behind the veil of ignorance. Ultimately, the members should satisfy themselves about the workability and stability of social structure so evolved. This is the fourth operative principle of the moral framework which includes the basic contractarian agreement wherein consenting parties are ready to surrender some of their freedoms to some authority, external or otherwise, in exchange for the protection of their remaining and significant rights. This attribute of workability makes JAF a political concept designed for the specific case of basic structure of society and not exclusively a moral doctrine (cf. JAFR 2001). 

JAFT starts with the original position and makes choices from among the existing contractarian, utilitarian, and other ideas including the idea of Justice as Fairness.

After comparative analysis, JAFT argues that its refined conception offers two JAF principles, which would be the preferred agreed choice of rational members (cf. JAFR, Part-II: Principles & Part-III: Arguments). We will treat them as a constructive conclusion of earlier fairness principles:

(1) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a full adequate scheme of equal liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and

(2) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:: (2a): they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and (2b) they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (the difference principle aka maximin principle)

The order of their listing is in accordance with their priority – (1) is prior to (2a) which is prior to (2b). Here priority means that in applying a principle the prior principles are assumed to be fully satisfied.

The equal liberties in (1) are stated as: freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; reciprocal personal rights & liberties, political liberties (right to vote and to participate in politics); freedom of association; finally, the rights and liberties covered by the law. These liberties and rights provide the political and social conditions essential for the adequate development and the full exercise of the two moral powers namely sense of justice and righteousness of actions of free and equal citizens.

Fair equality of opportunity in (2a) is said to require not merely that public offices and social positions be open in the formal sense, but that all should have a fair chance to attain them regardless of their social class of birth and origin. All through the society, there are to be roughly the same prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly motivated and endowed.  

If the the JAF (1) covers constitutional essentials of rights and liberties, the JAF (2a) offers equality of opportunity, and JAF (2b) endeavors for minimizing social & o-economic disparities. 

We can form socio-political systems and institutions based on JAF principles though their success depends on how effectively they are managed. Thus, “workability” which may invoke divinity (collective conscience) is effectively elevated to the level of principle. This divinity is also implied when we conceptualize the rational being of JAFT as the contextualized jīvanmukta.